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NOTES
INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS IN A FEDERAL
CHARTERING SYSTEM
Federal chartering of corporations is not a new issue to confront bus-
inessmen, legislators, and commentators. James Madison first voiced
demands for a federal chartering system at the Constitutional Conven-
tion of 1787.1 Although the Convention rejected Madison's proposal,2
similar plans have been advanced during periods of heightened public
concern over the political, economic, and social power of the corpora-
tion.3 From 1903 to 1914 Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson sup-
ported over twenty bills that would have required federal licensing of
corporations, but none became law.4 During the Depression Senators
O'Mahoney and Borah sponsored the cause of federal chartering, but
their proposals likewise met defeat.'
Concern over the expanding power of the corporation has again
come to the forefront of political debate, along with numerous and di-
verse proposals to reform state chartering laws, 6 strengthen judicial en-
1. Note, Federal Chartering of Corporations: Constitutional Challenges, 61 GEO. L.J. 123,
125 (1972). See Brabner-Smith, FederalIncorporation ofBusiness, 24 VA. L. REV. 159, 159 (1937).
2. On August 18, 1787, James Madison proposed that the Constitution confer on Congress
"a power to grant charters of incorporation where the interest of the United States might require
and the legislative provisions of individual states may be incompetent." J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 549 (E. Scott ed. 1898). Although three states favored the proposal,
eight states voted against it as unnecessary and conducive to monopolies. Note, supra note 1, at
126.
3. See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, COMPILATION OF PROPOSALS AND VIEws FOR AND
AGAINST INCORPORATION AND LICENSING OF CORPORATIONS, S. Doc. No. 92, 70th Cong., Ist
Sess., pt. 69-A (1934); L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 107 (2d ed. 1961); Note, supra note 1, at
124-28.
4. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 108; R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE
GIANT CORPORATION 67 (1976) [hereinafter cited as R. NADER]; Schwartz, .4 Case for Federal
Chartering of Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125, 1126 (1976).
5. Hearings on S, 10 Before a Subcomm. ofthe Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 326 (1937). See R. NADER, supra note 4, at 69-70; Henning, Federal Corporate Chartering
ofBig Business: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. 915, 919 (1972).
6. Commentators indicate that the possibility of reform through changes in state law is only
theoretical. See Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663, 668 (1974); Folk, State Statutes.: Their Role in Prescribing Norms ofResponsible Management
Conduct, 31 Bus. LAW. 1031, 1034 (1976); Jennings, Federalization of Corporation Law- Part Way
or4l the Way, 31 Bus. LAW. 991, 992 (1976); Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1131-33.
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forcement of existing codes,7 and enact federal legislation in the form
of either a federal incorporations' or minimum standards act.9
Part I of this Note examines the problems inherent in the present
system of state chartering that have led reformers to advocate a federal
solution. Part II focuses on one specific concern in state chartering sys-
tems-the power of the corporation to indemnify or insure its directors
for corporate acts that give rise to causes of action against individual
directors. Part III then analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the
indemnification and insurance provisions in several state codes to de-
velop a model federal statute for the indemnification of corporate man-
agement.
I. STATE CORPORATE CHARTERING SYSTEMS
The present-day corporation is a development of the post-Civil War
era.'0 Before the Civil War state legislatures individually chartered
corporations for specific purposes, such as the building of bridges or
highways, to advance the welfare of the general public."I The states
rigidly defined the corporate entity through specific requirements on
capitalization, detailed restrictions on permissible business purposes,
and time limitations on the corporation's period of existence. 2 New
York, for example, revised its constitution in 1846 to provide that cor-
porations could not be created by special act "[e]xcept ...in cases
7. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1133-34. See generally note 27 infra and accompanying
text.
8. Under a federal incorporations act, the federal government would preempt the states'
power to charter corporations. The foremost contemporary advocate of federal chartering of cor-
porations is Ralph Nader. See R. NADER, supra note 4. See also Schwartz, supra note 4; Note,
Federal Chartering of Corporation.- A Proposal, 61 GEo. L.J. 89, 110 (1972).
9. Professor William Cary is the leading advocate of a federal minimum standards act,
which would establish a dual (state and federal) system of corporate chartering. Corporations
would continue to draw their charters from the states, but the states would be subject to general
standards imposed by the federal act. See Cary, supra note 6, at 700-05.
For criticisms of Cary's proposal, see Arsht, Reply to Professor Cary, 31 Bus. LAW. 1113 (1976);
Drexler, Federalism and Corporate Law, 4 Misguided Missile, 3 SEc. REG,. L.J. 374 (1976); Hen-
ning, Federalism and Corporate Law. The Chaos Inherent in the Cary Proposal, 3 SEc. REG. L.J.
362 (1976); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977).
10. J. BLUM, B. CATrON, E. MORGAN, A. SCHLESINGER, JR., K. STAMPP & C. WOODWARD,
THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE 437 (2d ed. 1968).
11. Henning, supra note 5, at 915.
12. Cary, supra note 6, at 664; Rubin, Corporations and Society: The Remedy of Federal and
International Incorporation, 23 AM. U.L. REv. 263, 269 (1973).
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where, in the judgment of the legislature, the objects of the corporation
cannot be attained under general laws."' 3
The modern corporation emerged in response to demands for a busi-
ness structure that would facilitate the accumulation and utilization of
capital created by the industrial revolution of the post-Civil War pe-
riod. 14 The states encouraged the development of a new business entity
by enacting general incorporation laws that resulted in virtually auto-
matic corporate chartering. 5 New Jersey adopted the first liberal in-
corporation statute in 1896.16 The statute permitted unlimited
corporate size and market concentration, lessened capital requirements,
and weakened shareholder control. 17
The Supreme Court further strengthened the position of the corpora-
tion through its extension of the fourteenth amendment definition of
"person" to the corporate entity in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pa-
c#ic Railroad.'" As a result of this decision, a corporation could con-
duct its business in states other than the one in which it had been
chartered, and moreover, all states would be required to grant "full
faith and credit" to the laws of the chartering state even if these laws
were more liberal than those of the state in which the corporation was
"doing business."'1 9
In response to criticisms from reformers such as the then-governor of
New Jersey, Woodrow Wilson, the New Jersey legislature amended its
corporation laws in 1913 to place restrictions on the state's chartering of
13. See N.Y. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1846).
14. Henning, supra note 5, at 915.
15. Id See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
135-37 (1932).
16. Law of April 21, 1896, ch. 185, 1896 N.J. Laws 120th Sess. 277. See Cary, supra note 6, at
664. Mr. Justice Brandeis in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
noted that the Act of 1896 is commonly credited with attracting the incorporation of such trusts as
Standard Oil. Id at 562-63.
17. See R. NADER, supra note 4, at 45-46.
18. 118 U.S. 394 (1886). See generally H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORA-
TIONS 111-13 (2d ed. 1970); Green, Corporations as Persons, Citizens, andPossessors ofLiberqy, 94
U. PA. L. REv. 202 (1946).
19. See Cary, supra note 6, at 669. But see Kaplan, Foreign Corporations and Local Corpo-
rate Policy, 21 VAND. L. REV. 433 (1968).
[Elven if it is held that the full faith and credit clause is applicable to the corporation
statute of the state of incorporation, it is doubtful whether such a holding in itself would
have the effect of inhibiting another state, which has a valid and substantial interest to
safeguard, from applying its own rule of law, even if contrary to that of the incorporating
state.
id at 447.
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corporations. 20 As a result of this amendment and Delaware's enact-
ment in 1915 of a more liberal incorporation statute, Delaware re-
placed New Jersey as the leader in the competition to charter large
corporations.2' During the 1920's Delaware-type statutes became the
national norm and offered an open-ended opportunity for promoters
and management to create the kind of corporation they desired.22
Today, Delaware continues to lead the "race to the bottom, '2 and
its popularity as a place for incorporation accounts for a significant
portion of total state revenues.24 Despite the enactment by other states
of Delaware-type incorporation statutes,25 Delaware provides a more
favorable climate for corporations because of the close relationship be-
tween the legislative and judicial processes, 26 the judiciary's liberal in-
terpretation of Delaware law, 7 and the enormous body of case law that
serves as precedent for corporate planning. 8
20. Law of Feb. 19, 1913, chs. 13-19, 1913 NJ. Laws 137th Sess. 25. See Cary, supra note 6,
at 664.
21. See DEL. REV. CODE ch. 65 (1915); R. NADER, supra note 4, at 51; Cary, supra note 6, at
664-65.
22. Car), supra note 6, at 666 (citing J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPO-
RATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1970, 13-57 (liberal legislation necessary to
enable corporation to perform its functional role)).
23. The "race to the bottom" concept originated in the famous dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Brandeis in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 559 (1933) ("The race was not of diligence but
of laxity."). See Jennings, supra note 6, at 992 n.3.
24. See Cary, supra note 6, at 668; Smith, Delaware Works Hard to Stay a Corporate Home
Sweet Home, FoRTUNE, Feb. 13, 1978, at 132 (256 of the Fortune 500 companies incorporate in
Delaware. The $58 million per year paid in franchise taxes and fees constitutes 13% of Delaware's
total revenue.).
25. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. tit. 22 (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A (West 1969); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. tit. 17 (Page 1978); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 (Purdon 1967).
26. See Cary, supra note 6, at 690-92.
27. Professor William Cary interprets the decisions of the Delaware courts as a relaxation of
fiduciary duties and standards of fairness. Cary, supra note 6, at 688-92. See, e.g., Manfield
Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885 (1959);
Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970); Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199
A.2d 548 (1964); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 40 Del. Ch. 335, 182 A.2d 328 (1962), aj'd,
41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963); American Hardware Corp. v. Savage Arms Corp., 37 Del.
Ch. 59, 136 A.2d 690 (1957). Cary believes that these judicial decisions indicate a desire on the
part of the courts to foster incorporation in Delaware. See Cary, supra note 6, at 690-92.
Ralph Nader also asserts the existence of a judicial bias by the Delaware courts in favor of large
corporations. He claims that Delaware shareholder rights during mergers have been subverted by
three conventional loopholes, one of which is judicial. See R. NADER, supra note 4, at 276-77.
28. See, e.g., Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883 (Del. 1970); Cheffv. Mathes, 41
Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 40 Del. Ch. 335, 182 A.2d
328 (1962), aj'd, 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (1963). See also Cary, squra note 6, at 670-84.
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The present system of state chartering has been criticized by several
groups," including public interest associations30 and consumer advo-
cates,3' but foremost among the critics have been proponents of share-
holder rights.32 Shareholder advocates view the state chartering
system, as exemplified by the Delaware statute,33 to be unresponsive to
One commentator, however, suggests that the recent decision of Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380
A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), which held that a controlling shareholder who causes a merger solely for the
purpose of "cashing out" minority shareholders violates the fiduciary duty he owes minority
shareholders, "demolished precedents," and raised questions about how reliable previous case law
may be. See Smith, supra note 24, at 133-34. The court's decision, however, in Tanzer v. Interna-
tional Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977), which held that a majority shareholder did
not violate its fiduciary duty by merging to facilitate long-term debt financing, may mitigate the
impact of the Singer decision.
29. An initial consideration in any analysis of the social and economic problems inherent in
the present state chartering system is whether the corporation's primary interest is to make a profit
or to benefit the public. Historically, the corporation has been viewed as "an entity interwoven
with public purpose." Rubin, supra note 12, at 268. Critics of this viewpoint argue that the sole
social responsibility of business is to use society's resources in activities designed to increase its
profits. See Manne, Should Corporations Assume More Social Responsibilities, in ATTACK ON
CORPORATE AMERICA 3 (M. Johnson ed. 1978); Friedman, The Social Responsibility ofBusiness is
to Increase its Profits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 32.
30. Public interest critics claim that the present state chartering system, as exemplified by the
Delaware statute, is the cause of a number of problems: (1) the lack of disclosure about industrial
pollution, see R. NADER, supra note 4, at 17-18, 140-45; Green, The Corporation and the Commu-
nit', in CORPORATE POWER IN AMERICA 42, 52 (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1973); (2) undesirable
political influence, see R. NADER, supra note 4, at 20-22, 153-57; Green, supra at 48; see generally
Crain, Do Corporations Wield Great Political Power?, in ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA, supra
note 29, at 59; (3) dependence of local communities, see R. NADER, supra note 4, at 23-24; see
generalq' Leibowitz, Do Corporations Capture Local Communities?, in ATTACK ON CORPORATE
AMERICA, supra note 29, at 63; (4) deceptive product information and advertising, see R. NADER,
supra note 4, at 24-26, 150-53; see generally Ayanian, Does 4dvertising Persuade Consumers to Buy
Things They' Do Not Need?, in ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA, supra note 29, at 236; (5)
potentially destructive technology, see R. NADER, supra note 4, at 25-28; (6) concentration of
wealth and power among large corporations, resulting in a lack of competition, high inflation, and
unemployment, see R. NADER, supra note 4, at 28-30; see generally Tollision, Is Industrial Concen-
tration the Cause of Inflation?, in ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA, supra note 29, at 194; (7)
wasteful corporate subsidies, see R. NADER, supra note 4, at 22-23; (8) abuses of employees (e.g.,
the threat of toxic substances in the work environment, discrimination against blacks and women,
worker alienation, and invasions of employees' rights of privacy), see R. NADER, supra note 4, at
18-20, 148-50; see generally Adie, Are Corporations Indiferent to Worker-Job 4lienation?, in AT-
TACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA, supra note 29, at 44; Martin, Do Corporations Discriminate
Against Minorities and Women?, in ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA, supra note 29, at 48; and
(9) business crime, see R. NADER, supra note 4, at 30-32.
31. See R. NADER, supra note 4, at 16-17. But see Winter, supra note 9 (market forces pro-
vide substantial protection for shareholders).
32. See, e.g., Schwartz, Federal Chartering of Corporations: An Introduction, 61 GEO. L. J. 71,
81-84 (1976) (noting the work of shareholder advocate Gilbert).
33. For example, Delaware law permits authorization of corporate action upon receipt of the
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shareholder rights. 34 Historically, shareholders controlled the corpora-
tion,35 but Delaware law has broadened the power and prerequisites of
management to subjugate shareholder rights and privileges. 6 The
board of directors now may propose fundamental changes such as
merger,37 sale of corporate assets,38 and charter amendments 39 without
a vote of the shareholders. In addition, the number of votes required
for shareholder approval of these changes has been reduced to fifty per-
written approval of the requisite number of shareholder votes. No meeting is required. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 228 (1974). Reformers view this practice as a device to circumvent disclosure
of corporate affairs to minority shareholders. See Cary, supra note 6, at 669; Folk, supra note 6, at
1042-43. Others interpret the provision as a means of reducing time and expense for meetings,
which are generally viewed as mere formalities. See Drexler, supra note 9, at 376.
In addition, critics argue that disclosure is inadequate under the present system because man-
agement prints "false and misleading reports." See R. NADER, supra note 4, at 84. For example,
Delaware does not have a state provision requiring disclosure of dividends declared from a source
other than earned surplus. But see Business Corporation Act § 46 (1974), which provides that a
corporation may pay dividends from any surplus and possibly mislead an investor about the
financial status of the corporation.
34. The theory that the present state chartering system is unresponsive to shareholders' rights
presumes that a corporation owes a duty to its stockholders to allow them to participate in the
corporation's management. See generally R. NADER, supra note 4; Cary, supra note 6; Folk, Some
Reflections of a Corporate Draftsman, 42 CONN. B.J. 409 (1968); Folk, Does Stale Corporation Law
Have a Future, 8 GA. ST. B.J. 311 (1972); Folk, supra note 6; Harris, The ModelBusiness Corpora-
tion Act-Invitation to Irresponsibility?, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1955). This premise runs counter to
the view that shareholders buy stock in public companies to make money on their investment and,
therefore, apart from major decisions, prefer that management control the decisionmaking, See
Arsht, supra note 9; Winter, supra note 9.
35. The early general corporation acts established the power of the shareholders to direct the
policy of the corporation. Shareholders had to unanimously approve any proposal to change the
corporation's assets, share structure, capitalization, or bylaws. See R. NADER, supra note 4, at 37.
36. An examination of the 1967 Revisions explains in part why Delaware has remained
the favorite of big business. Management power and prerequisites were broadened as
never before by such provisions as: § 242--only directors, not shareholders, may pro-
pose amendments to the corporate charter, §§ 143 and 122(15)-plans for loans to of-
ficers, stock options, stock bonuses, and incentive compensation were authorized, but
lacking procedures to avoid abuses or even disclose to shareholders the amounts in-
volved; § 145-officers and directors could be indemnified for all court costs and settle-
ments of criminal and civil cases without court or shareholder approval; and § 252-
management was given the power to merge certain subsidiary corporations without a
shareholder vote.
Id at 58.
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1974 & Supp. 1978). See generally F. O'NEAL, OPPRES-
SION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS § 5.13 (1975).
38. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1974). See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note 37, at § 5.17
(sale of corporate business, franchise, and assets).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242 (1974 & Supp. 1978). See generally F. O'NEAL, supra note
37, at § 5.05 (charter amendment).
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cent.41 Critics also contend that Delaware's elimination of the cumula-
tive voting requirement,41 along with its provision for the staggered
election of corporate directors,42 has diminished the voting power of
minority shareholders.43 A statutory provision that denies preemptive
rights44 and permits management to issue nonvoting stock or stock with
unequal rights and preferences also gives rise to objections by advo-
cates of shareholder voting rights.45
Paralleling this decline in shareholder power is the appearance of a
panoply of director benefits, which most frequently includes the indem-
40. See sources cited in notes 37-39 supra. Reformers argue that the 50% rule renders share-
holders powerless to effect corporate change and fails to safeguard minority rights. See Folk,
,upra note 6, at 1039. But see Arsht, supra note 9, at 1119 (50% rule is more democratic).
41. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (1974). Under a system of cumulative voting, each share-
holder is entitled to a vote equal to his number of shares multiplied by the number of directors to
be elected. The shareholder may cast his entire vote for one director-candidate or split his vote
among the candidates in any manner. Delaware does not require cumulative voting in large cor-
porations.
Thirty-two states also permit but do not require cumulative voting, but even those corporations
that utilize cumulative voting have the means to subvert it. In Delaware, for example, a simple
majority may repeal cumulative voting. Along with 42 other jurisdictions, Delaware allows classi-
fication of directors, which may reduce to one-third or one-quarter the number of directors re-
quired to stand for reelection annually and increase the number of votes necessary to elect a
director. See R. NADER, supra note 4, at 88-89.
42. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (Supp. 1978). Corporations commonly stagger the elec-
tion of board directors so that each director serves three terms before subject to a reelection vote.
See H. HENN, supra note 18, at 410-11.
43. See Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78, 126 N.E. 2d 701 (1955), in which the Illinois Supreme
Court held that the staggered-election provision of the Illinois Business Corporation Act violated
the cumulative voting provision of the Illinois constitution. But see Arsht, supra note 9, at 1119-20
(cumulative voting rights in large corporations are of no practical utility to minority shareholders).
44. Most jurisdictions expressly permit the articles of incorporation to deny or limit preemp-
tive rights. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b) (1974); GA. CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 22-602
(1977); H. HENN, supra note 18, at 215. The purpose of preemptive rights is to prevent dilution of
a shareholder's percentage of ownership in a corporation by requiring a corporation making a new
offering to first offer the additional shares to existing shareholders. See generally H. HENN, supra
note 18, at 215-16.
Preemptive rights are arguably of minimal value if a shareholder of a publicly traded security
has other means to increase his stock holdings. See Arsht, supra note 9, at 1119-20. In addition,
corporations claim that mandatory preemptive rights are outmoded and geared towards close cor-
porations, and limit the corporations' flexibility in both the timing and the size of stock issues. See
Wall St. J., Mar. 20, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
45. See DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151 (1974); R. NADER, supra note 4, at 89.
The New York Stock Exchange rule that prohibits the listing of nonvoting common stock and
prescribes minimum voting rights for listed preferred stock eliminates this problem to a great
extent. See R. NADER, supra note 4, at 89; Arsht, supra note 9, at 1122. A Delaware law, which
gives nonvoting stock a class vote on charter amendments, also addresses this problem. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(c)(2) (Supp. 1978).
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nification or insurance of management for corporate misconduct, 46 the
right to establish executive salaries and pension plans, 47 and the estab-
lishment of generous noncash benefits.48 The increased power of direc-
tors also creates a greater potential for abuse of position and laxness in
the exercise of fiduciary duties and responsibilities.49
These criticisms, as well as others,5" of state chartering statutes have
led reformers to call for the adoption of a federal system of charter-
ing.5 1 Reformers argue that a federal system would prevent a state
from granting corporations special treatment to retain their presence
within the state or to entice foreign corporations into the state. Advo-
cates of federal chartering also assert that a federal system would pro-
vide a central control over multinational corporations and diffuse large
concentrations of corporate power. Proponents maintain that a federal
system would better protect the consumer and general public by moni-
toring corporate power and serving as a reminder to corporate manage-
ment that they hold "their charters in trust for the public. '52 Finally,
supporters contend that a federal system could more effectively regu-
late violations and impose penalties when necessary.5 3
As a result of these criticisms, proposals for a federal chartering sys-
tem continue to be debated. 4 Senator Henry Jackson's Interior Com-
46. See notes 58-150 infra and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(h) (1974) (board of directors fixes the compensa-
tion of directors); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(15) (1974) (directors may establish pension plans,
stock bonus plans, profit sharing plans, and other incentive plans); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143
(1974) (loans may be made to executives).
48. Noncash benefits include life and medical insurance, free medical service, educational
grants to executives' children, company apartments, country club memberships, luncheon or din-
ner club memberships, chauffeur-driven cars, and expense accounts. See R. NADER, supra note 4,
at 117.
49. See R. NADER, supra note 4, at 118, 122. For an overview of the role of the board of
directors, see H. KOONTZ, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT (1967); M.
MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971).
50. For a comprehensive study of the possible problems of minority shareholders, see F.
O'NEAL, supra note 37.
51. For a discussion of the history of federal incorporation and licensing proposals, see L.
Loss, supra note 3, at 107-Il; R. NADER, supra note 4, at 65-71; Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1126-
27.
52. E. MCSWEENEY, MANAGING THE MANAGERS 131 (1978).
53. Id.
54. For recent discussions on the issue of federal chartering, see Hyman, Do Lenient State
Incorporation Laws Injure Minoriy Shareholders?, in ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA, suFra
note 29, at 166; Martin, Do Corporations Have No Inherent Rights Only Government.given Privi-
leges, in ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA, supra note 29, at 151; Morgan, Is Federal Chartering
Necessary to Curb Corporate Power?, in ATTACK ON CORPORATE AMERICA, supra note 29, at 158.
[Vol. 1979:523
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mittee examined federal chartering bills in 1974."5 Representative
James Stanton unsuccessfully introduced a bill in 1975 that would have
required the one hundred largest corporations to obtain federal char-
ters.56 Senator Howard Metzenbaum most recently revived the issue in
Congress before the Senate Subcommittee on Citizens and Sharehold-
ers Rights and Remedies. 7
If federal legislation is to become a reality, however, general inquir-
ies must be abandoned for specific analyses of identified weaknesses in
the present system of state chartering. Only then can a federal remedy
be constructed that will garner the support of a legislative majority.
The indemnification or insurance of corporate directors for corporate
misbehavior offers one specific concern ripe for an alternative consis-
tent with the philosophy of federal incorporation.
II. INDEMNIFICATION AND INDEMNITY INSURANCE FOR CORPORATE
DIRECTORS
The common law of agency required a principal to indemnify its
agents against third-party claims in the event an agent performed an act
that, although authorized, constituted a tort or breach of contract.5 8
The law of corporations, however, remained unsettled over whether
corporate directors or officers could be characterized as agents of the
corporation and, therefore, entitled to indemnity. 9
The first decision to focus on the director's right to indemnity came
in 1906. In Figge v. Bergenthall° the Wisconsin Supreme Court exon-
erated individual directors of a corporation in a fraud suit and upheld
Some commentators argue that the federal securities laws have created a federal law of corpora-
tions. See, e.g., Fleischer, "Federal Corporation Law'" An Assessment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1146
(1965); Jacobs, The Role of Securities Exchange Act Rule ob-5 in the Regulation of Corporate
Management, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 27 (1973); Comment, Schoenbaum v. First Brook: The "New
Fraud" Expands Federal Corporation Law, 55 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1969). Sante Fe Industries, Inc.
v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), however, may limit the role of the federal government in preventing
fraud in securities transactions.
55. Federal Chartersfor Energy Corporations-Selected Materials, Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
56. Congressional Record, H.R. 7481, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 15897 (1975).
57. Hearings Before the Subcommn on Citizens & Shareholders Rights and Remedies of the
Comm of the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 439(c) (1958).
59. See Johnston, Corporate Indemn'fcation and Liability Insurance for Directors and Of-
ficers, 33 Bus. LAW. 1993, 1994 (1978).
60. 130 Wis. 594, 109 N.W. 581 (1906). See G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, INDEMNIFYING
THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 83 (1963).
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the payment of attorneys' fees out of corporate funds in defense of the
action.6' Shareholder ratification of the payments, though not unani-
mous, may have influenced the court's holding. 62 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court again faced the issue sixteen years later in Jesse v. Four-
Wheel Drive Auto Company.63 Despite Figge, the court characterized
Jesse as a case of first impression and held that a unanimous vote of
the stockholders is required for a corporation to assume the costs of
defense in an action for defendant-directors' alleged misrepresentations
in the sale of stock.'
Nine years later the Ohio Court of Appeals confronted the indemni-
fication issue in Griese v. Lang. The directors of a corporation in
Griese successfully defended a shareholder action charging the direc-
tors with negligence in the performance of their corporate duties. The
court held that the attorneys' fees of the directors could be funded from
the corporate treasury only if some benefit inured to the corporation
and the shareholders approved the payments.66
In the last of the early decisions on the issue, a New York court in
New York Dock Co., Inc. v. McCollum 67 held that the expenditure of
corporate funds to indemnify a director who successfully defended a
derivative action was ultra vires.68 The court discounted the theory
that a director is an agent of the corporation entitled to recover for
expenditures made in the transaction of his principal's affairs.69 The
court also rejected the view that a director derives his powers from ei-
ther the shareholders or the corporation so that shareholder or board
approval of his acts could justify the use of corporate funds to reim-
burse his litigation expenses.70 Instead, the court declared a director's
status to be suigeneris with the director; thus, any corporate expendi-
ture to indemnify the director would exceed the corporation's scope of
powers because it could derive no benefit from the director's successful
defense of an action not against the corporation.7' Though the corpo-
61. 130 Wis. at 625, 109 N.W. at 592.
62. Id at 609, 109 N.W. at 586.
63. 177 Wis. 627, 189 N.W. 276 (1922).
64. Id at 634, 189 N.W. at 278.
65. 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N.E. 222 (1931).
66. id at 557, 175 N.E. at 223.
67. 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
68. Id at 111, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 849.
69. Id at 109, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
70. Id
71. Id
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ration might benefit from indemnification to the extent that it could
more easily induce responsible persons to become directors, the court
maintained that liability is a risk assumed by any director, responsible
or irresponsible.72
The McCollum decision triggered the passage of the nation's first in-
denmification statute by the New York Assembly in 1941. 73 Less than
a year later, a New York court in Hayman v. Morris74 upheld the legis-
lature's determination that without indemnification the public would
be deprived of the services of capable executives, and affirmed the fair-
ness of corporate reimbursement of directors and officers who success-
fully defend their acts taken on behalf of the corporation."s
Similar statutes and court decisions followed in other jurisdictions.76
In Solimine v. Hollander77 a New Jersey court held that a director who
prevails on the merits of his alleged misconduct may be reimbursed for
expenses incurred in defense of the action.78 The court flatly rejected
the McCollum court's view that a director assumes the risk of litigation
expenses in accepting corporate office.7 9 More importantly, the court
recognized the argument rejected in McCollum that indemnification for
attorneys' fees is essential to the corporation's ability to attract compe-
tent directors.8 0 Echoing the decision of the Solimine court, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota in In re E.C. Warner Co. 8 1 upheld reim-
bursement on the ground that the inducement of responsible persons to
corporate office serves the needs of public policy. 2 The court also
72. Id at 112, 16 N.Y.S.2d at 850.
73. Law of April 2, 1941, ch. 209, § 1, 1941 N.Y. Laws 164th Sess. 813; Law of April 14, 1941,
ch. 350, § 1, 1941 N.Y. Laws 164th Sess. 1034 (repealed 1945).
74. 37 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
75. Id at 893-94.
76. See L. Loss, supra note 3, at 1829-30; Note, Liability Insurancefor Corporate Officers and
Directors: The Searchfor a Model Enabling Statute, 50 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1120, 1126 (1975). For
examples of the legislative enactments triggered by the McCollum case, see CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 803 (West Supp. 1975); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (1974); MINN. STAT ANN. § 301.905 (1969);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 721-26 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1975); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1701.13(e) (Page Supp. 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1410 (Supp. 1975).
77. 129 N.J. Eq. 264, 19 A.2d 344 (Ch. 1941).
78. Id at 265, 19 A.2d at 345.
79. Id at 269-70, 19 A.2d at 346-47.
80. "It is certainly just and reasonable that corporate officers and directors who have been
put to expense in successfully defending themselves against actions of this kind should be reim-
bursed in reasonable amounts." Id
81. 232 Minn. 207, 212, 45 N.W.2d 388, 392 (1950).
82. Id at 214-15, 45 N.W.2d at 393,
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ruled that a director need not demonstrate a tangible benefit to the cor-
poration to recover his expenses if he is vindicated on the merits of the
action against him. 3
Today, all state general corporation statutes provide indemnification
of directors and officers in some form.8 4 The primary policy considera-
tion in favor of indemnification is the need to attract the best people
available to run American corporations. Proponents of indemnifica-
tion fear that without this protection, those most qualified to serve as
directors not only will be reluctant to participate on corporate boards,
but will avoid service altogether.8 5 This fear is particularly strong
among those who advocate the presence of more outside directors on
corporate boards for their special knowledge or experience, their ability
to supervise or police the active management of the corporation, and
their business contacts or prestige.8 6 Implicit in this consideration is
the desire that directors serve fearlessly in the knowledge that the cor-
poration they serve will support their expert judgments. Recognizing
83. Id
84. A 1975 commentary indicated that all but two states, Idaho and New Hampshire, have
indemnification provisions. Barrett, Mandatory Indemnffication of Corporate Officers and Direc-
tors, 29 Sw. LJ. 727, 727 (1975). Currently, Idaho and New Hampshire have indemnification
provisions. See IDAHO CODE tit. 30, § 166 (Supp. 1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 294:4 (1977).
85. Orvel Sebring, then Chairman-Elect of the ABA Section on Corporation, Banking and
Business Laws, stated in 1966: "[Indemnification] is good social policy ... because we get the
best men available to run our corporations. The lifeblood of business depends upon the quality of
guidance which officers and directors can give the corporations. So there is a strong case for
indemnification." Sebring, Symposiur Duties and Liabilities of Corporate Directors, 22 Bus.
LAW. 29, 124 (1966).
The rise in stockholder's suits and the increasing awareness of the liabilities which
may result therefrom has had the disturbing effect of deterring many able men from
service as corporate directors as well as causing the resignation of some. Many who
resigned or who have been deterred feared that pressures of other affairs would prevent
them from being adequately informed of the company's activities and thus would in-
crease the possibility of their liability in a suit based upon acts of which they were una-
ware.
Cheek, Control of Corporate Indemnfcation: A Proposed Statute, 22 VAND. L. REV. 255, 274
(1969). See M. SCHABETLER, THE LIABILITIES OF OFFICE: INDEMNIFICATION AND INSURANCE OF
CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 72-73 (1976); G. WASHINGTON & J. BISHOP, supra note
60, at 5; Comment, Lawfor Sale: Study ofthe Delaware Corporation Law of1967, 117 U. PA. L.
REV. 861, 875 (1969).
86. The threat of litigation, the annoyance of public inspection, the consumption of val-
uable time, and the probability of being held liable for large amounts of money fre-
quently outweigh the benefits of the position of outside directors, and explain why many
businessmen are reluctant to serve on boards and, if they do, why they insist on being
protected, either by indemnification or by insurance.
M. SCHAEFTLER, supra note 85, at 218. See Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoys. New Trends in the
Indemnofcation of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1092-93 (1968).
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the importance of this objective, courts repeatedly have upheld corpo-
rate indemnification of directors.8 7
The need to attract competent persons to corporate directorships also
underscores the importance of reaching an equilibrium between the
compensation granted corporate directors and the risks directors as-
sume in performance of their duties. The present-day director faces a
greater risk of third-party actions for misdeeds, mismanagement, or
negligence than did his predecessor," and the costs of defense have
correspondingly mushroomed.89 Influenced by these developments,
proponents of indemnification reason that these risks must be shifted to
the corporation to reflect the modem-day reality.90 The executive must
receive either a higher salary or a promise that his expenses will be
reimbursed in the event of litigation.9 Viewed as a form of compensa-
tion, indemnification may be more equitable to both the director and
the corporation and its shareholders than a fixed salary increment, be-
cause indemnification occurs only when litigation arises and only in the
amount of costs actually incurred by the director.92
Advocates of indemnification also assert that its benefits extend to
plaintiffs as well as defendants. The availability of indemnification or
liability insurance assures plaintiffs a fund from which to recover on
87. See, e.g., Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Wolfson, 321 A.2d 138, 141 (Del. 1974);
Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362, 363-64, 101 N.W.2d 423, 425 (1960);
In re E.C. Warner Co., 232 Minn. 207, 214-15,45 N.W.2d 388, 393 (1950); Solimine v. Hollander,
129 N.J. Eq. 264, 272, 19 A.2d 344, 348 (1941). But cf Galdi v. Berg, 359 F. Supp. 698, 701 (D.
Del. 1973) (indemnification disallowed for derivative action against corporation's officer dismissed
without prejudice); New York Dock Co. v. McCollum, 173 Misc. 106, 111-12, 16 N.Y.S.2d 844,
849-50 (1939) (directors not entitled to indemnification when successful defense of derivative ac-
tion did not benefit corporation).
88. Note, supra note 76, at 1120.
89. Had "damages in the well-known Texas G, 6 Sulphur litigation been assessed on a resti-
tution basis . . . their amount would have exceeded the assets of the company by some $150
million." Id at 1120 n.3.
90. See G. WAsHINGTON & J. BIsHoP, supra note 60, at 5.
91. Id
92. See, e.g., Sorenson v. Overland Corp., 142 F. Supp. 354, 354, 360 (D. Del. 1956), aJ'd,
242 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1957).
The equation of indemnification or insurance with compensation for services performed, how-
ever, may not be consistent with what public policy considers acceptable compensation. See
Bishop, supra note 86, at 1091. A court might find the characterization of indemnification or
insurance as compensation impermissible on the grounds that it constitutes waste or lacks a rea-
sonable relationship to the value of the director's service. See generally Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S.
582 (1933); M. SCHAEFTLER, supra note 85, at 113.
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judgments against corporate tortfeasors93 and assures defendant-direc-
tors the resources necessary to conduct a defense on the merits of the
disputed conduct.94
Persuasive arguments also have been advanced against indemnifica-
tion and indemnity provisions. Foremost is the contention that the
availability of indemnification or insurance, which allows a director to
escape financial liability for his wrongful acts, undermines a more im-
portant policy objective-deterrence of corporate misconduct. The
paramount importance of this objective has been long established by
the common-law rule that bars the issuance of insurance for intention-
ally inflicted harm.95 Statutory provisions that allow a corporation to
purchase insurance on behalf of its directors, officers, employees, and
agents for liability arising out of their intentional wrongdoings decrease
the likelihood that the threat of liability will deter breaches of the
fiduciary duty directors owe to the corporation and its shareholders.
Critics also question whether indemnification benefits the corporation
in attracting qualified directors who fear personal liability for their mis-
takes when these mistakes amount to willful misconduct. To protect
any director who places his own interests above those of the corpora-
tion would be unwise.and harmful to the corporation.97
Aside from its adverse effect on intentional misconduct, indemnifica-
tion opponents argue that indemnity for negligent actions will lower
the standard of care required of directors.9 The argument, however, is
93. See M. SCHAEFTLER, supra note 85, at 86, 100; Israels, A New Look at Corporate Director-
ship, 24 Bus. LAW. 727, 738 (1969); Note, Public Policy and Directors' Liability Insurance, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 716, 718 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Public Policy]; Note, Liability Insurance for
Corporate Executives, 80 HARV. L. REv. 648, 654 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Corporate Execu.
lives].
94. M. SCHAEFTLER, supra note 85, at 80.
95. Note, supra note 76, at 1123.
96. See Bishop, supra note 86, at 1085; Note, supra note 76, at 1127. Proponents of indemni-
fication characterize the deterrent effect of personal liability as speculative because litigation ex-
penses bear little relationship to the degree of misconduct alleged against the corporate officer.
See M. SCHAEFTLER, supra note 85, at 80. See also de Ravel D'Esclapon, Liability of Directors to
Shareholders/or Negligence Under American Law and Their Indemnofication, 16 McGILL L.J. 323,
384 (1970).
97. M. SCHAEFTLER, supra note 85, at 100.
98. Some authorities believe that the threat of civil or criminal liability could deter one's
negligence. The fear that one will have to pay large damages if found liable would
induce him to be more careful ....
It is important to point out that those who believe that negligent behavior cannot be
deterred would not hesitate to recommend indemnity contract, since no personal or de-
terrent grounds are undermined. On the other hand, those who believe that negligent
[Vol. 1979:523
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much less compelling than in the case of intentional misbehavior. Lit-
tle evidence exists to support the belief that either indemnification or
indemnity insurance will lead to an increase in carelessness or a decline
in standards of care.99 The widespread availability of liability insur-
ance for ordinary negligence in connection with motor vehicles, for ex-
ample, also argues for the insurability of directors for mere negligent
breaches of corporate responsibility."°°
Another argument voiced against indemnification centers upon the
"business judgment rule."'' These opponents assert that the need for
indemnification is obsolete because the business judgment rule virtu-
ally immunizes directors from liability for judgments uninfluenced by
personal considerations."0 2 The rule, however, does not protect a direc-
tor who fails to exercise judgment on a matter that gives rise to a claim
of negligence. 0 3 Furthermore, the business judgment rule does not
shield an "outside director"'" who views the directorship as "an hon-
orary position which. . . had nothing to do with the activities of the
corporation." 05
conduct could be deterred might be disturbed by insurance, since it could be argued that
insurance alleviates the punitive and deterrent consequences of misconduct and encour-
ages careless conduct.
Id at 82 n.7.
99. Id at 93. See Public Policy, supra note 93, at 721; Corporate Executives, supra note 93, at
667.
100. See Public Polic;, supra note 93, at 723; Corporate Executives, supra note 93, at 654.
Critics note, however, that an issue inherent in these arguments against insurance and indemni-
fication is whether negligence is, in fact, deterrable. Indemnification advocates also point to the
experience in the fields of law and medicine where the existence of malpractice insurance has not
resulted in a lower standard of care. See M. SCHAEFTLER, supra note 85, at 95; Drexler, supra
note 9, at 376; Israels, supra note 93, at 738; Public Polic); supra note 93, at 724. Professional
sanctions and social pressures act to deter misconduct by lawyers and physicians more so than the
threat of civil liability. See M. SCHAEFrLER, supra note 85, at 85-86. Critics note, however, that
the analogy to medical and legal malpractice is inaccurate and inappropriate because the weight
of societal concern in the case of a physician whose lack of care causes physical injury is much
greater than in the case of a director whose negligence results in economic loss. See id at 85.
101. Under the business judgment rule, "[t]he law will not interfere with the internal affairs of
a corporation so long as it is managed by its directors pursuant to a free, honest exercise of judg-
ment uninfluenced by personal, or by any considerations other than the welfare of the corpora-
tion." Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
102. See Public Policy, supra note 93, at 724-25.
103. Id at 727.
104. An "outside director" is a director who does not hold an executive or other employee
position in the company. Bus. WEEK, May 11, 1974, at 34.
105. Platt Corp. v. Platt, 42 Misc. 2d 640,645,249 N.Y.S.2d 1, 8 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aft'dmera, 23
App. Div. 2d 823, 258 N.Y.S.2d 629 (App. Div. 1965), rev'don other grounds, 17 N.Y.2d 234, 217
N.E.2d 134. 270 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1966).
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In a final argument against indemnification, some commentators as-
sert that indemnification and insurance statutes run contrary to the dis-
closure policy underlying the federal securities laws. t°6 In Globus v.
Law Research Service, Inc., a New York federal district court held that
a securities underwriter, who had actual knowledge of the omission of
material facts from the prospectus filed with the SEC, could not enforce
the indemnification provisions of the underwriting agreement with the
issuer. 10 7 In support of its holding, the court cited Securities and Ex-
change Commission Rule 46018 for the proposition that indemnifica-
tion of directors and officers undermines public policy.'0 9 The
language of the rule, however, reveals that "there is no public policy
against indemnification of a director or officer for the expenses of a
successful defense." I"
In view of the aforementioned policy considerations, a substantial
case can be made for the indemnification or insurance of corporate di-
106. See Barrett, supra note 84, at 742; Bishop, New Problems in Indemnfying and Insuring
Directors: Protection 4gainst Liability Under the Federal Securities Laus, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1153;
Johnston, supra note 59, at 2008; Kroll, Some Reflections on Indemnification Provisions and SE. C.
Liability Insurance in the Light of Bar-Chris and Globus, 24 Bus. LAw. 681 (1969).
Other commentators suggest, however, that the SEC might view insurance as acceptable even if
it might object to direct indemnification. See Knepper, Officers and Directors: Indemnificaion and
Liability Insurance-4n Update, 30 Bus. LAW. 951, 958 (1975); Note, supra note 76, at 1145.
107. 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
108. The note to Rule 460, promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933, provides in part:
(a) Where, by reason of any charter provision, by-law, contract, arrangements, stat-
ute, or otherwise, provision is made for indemnification by the registrant of a director,
officer or controlling person of the registrant against liabilities arising under the act,
unless waiver is obtained from such officer, director or controlling person of the benefits
of such indemnification with respect to the proposed offering or there is included in the
registration statement, a brief description of the indemnification provision and an under-
taking in substantially the following form:
Insofar as indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act of 1933 may
be permitted to directors, officers and controlling persons of the registrant pursuant to
the foregoing provisions, or otherwise, the registrant has been advised that in the opinion
of the Securities and Exchange Commission such indemnification is against public policy
as expressed in the act and is, therefore, unenforceable. In the event that a claim for
indemnification against such liabilities (other than the payment by the registrant of ex-
penses incurred orpaid by a director, officer or controlling person of the registrant in the
succes&ul defense o/any action, suit orproceeding) is asserted by such director, officer or
controlling person in connection with the securities being registered, the registrant will,
unless in the opinion of its counsel the matter has been settled by controlling precedent,
submit to a court of appropriate jurisdiction the question whether such indemnification
by it is against public policy as expressed in the act and will be governed by the final
adjudication of such issue.
17 C.F.R. § 230.460 (1978) (emphasis added).
109. 418 F.2d at 1288.
110. See Johnston, supra note 59, at 2008-09.
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rectors, at least under some circumstances. The task at hand, therefore,
is to develop a federal statutory scheme that accommodates this range
of competing interests and goals."' The strengths and weaknesses of
indemnification and insurance provisions in several state codes provide
an analytical springboard for this effort.
III. INDEMNIFICATION IN A FEDERAL CHARTERING SYSTEM
One of the most significant state indemnification statutes is that en-
acted by Delaware in 1967.112 Section 145(a) of the Delaware act per-
mits a corporation to indemnify its directors, officers, employees, and
agents against third-party claims for actual and reasonable expenses,
judgments, fines, and settlements, provided that the indemnified party
"acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in or
not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to
any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe
his conduct was unlawful."1 "3 This type of provision, if incorporated
into a federal chartering system, would protect the director who acted
reasonably and in good faith and simultaneously deter willful miscon-
11l. In light of the SEC policy against indemnification of officers and directors, the following
analysis will encompass only those liabilities currently covered by state corporation laws. A seri-
ous question remains, however, about the impact of a federal corporation law on the SEC policy
opposing indemnification.
112. See Brook, Directors: Indemnfcation and Liability Insurance, 21 N.Y.L.F. 1, 5 (1975).
Because of its pervasive influence, the Delaware indemnification statute is the one most frequently
analyzed by commentators. See, e.g., R. NADER, supra note 4, at 108; Bishop, supra note 86, at
1083-88; Cary, supra note 6, at 665; Johnston, supra note 59, at 1996-2000; Comment, supra note
85, at 874-86.
113. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974) provides:
A corporation may indemnify any person who was or is a party or is threatened to be
made a party to any threatened, pending or completed action, suit or proceeding,
whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative (other than an action by or in the
right of the corporation) by reason of the fact that he is or was a director, officer, em-
ployee or agent of the corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the corporation
as a director, officer, employee or agent of another corporation, partnership, joint ven-
ture, trust or other enterprise, against expenses (including attorneys' fees), judgments,
fines and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably incurred by him in connec-
tion with such action, suit or proceeding if he acted in good faith and in a manner he
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and,
with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe his
conduct was unlawful. The termination of any action, suit or proceeding by judgment,
order, settlement, conviction, or upon a plea of nolo coniendere or its equivalent, shall
not, of itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good faith and in a
manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation, and, with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had reasonable
cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful.
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duct or abuse of power. Section 145(b) affords similar protection to cor-
porate personnel in derivative actions, but with an additional
requirement of court approval for indemnity payments. 114
The statutory distinction between third-party and derivative actions
is significant. In a third-party action, the plaintiff recovers for a per-
sonal wrong; a judgment against the director, therefore, does not imply
that the director committed a wrongful act against the corporation. In
a derivative action, however, the nominal plaintiff is the corporation;
thus, a judgment against the director generally indicates that he
breached his fiduciary duty to the corporation and should be entitled to
indemnity only when someone not a party to the litigation deems it
reasonable and proper.'
The Delaware approach, however, fails to strike an equitable bal-
ance between the corporation's need for the power to indemnify its per-
sonnel and the shareholders' right as owners of the corporation to
oversee its operations. The statute fails to require the corporation to
notify its stockholders of indemnification payments, or to grant the
courts authority to compel shareholder notification."16 The "nonexclu-
sive clause" in section 145(f) further tips the balance in favor of corpo-
rate personnel; any indemnification provided in section 145 does not
preclude an indemnified party from asserting any other rights to in-
demnification to which he may be entitled under any bylaw, agree-
ment, or vote of the stockholders or disinterested directors.' 7
114. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(b) (1974) provides:
A corporation shall have the power to indemnify any person who was or is a party or
is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or completed action or suit
by or in the right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by reason of the
fact that he is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or was
serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of an-
other corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise against expenses
(including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably incurred by him in connection with
the defense or settlement of such action or suit if he acted in good faith and in a manner
he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation
and except that no indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim, issue or matter
as to which such person shall have been adjudged to be liable for negligence or miscon-
duct in the performance of his duty to the corporation unless and only to the extent that
the Court of Chancery of the court in which such action or suit was brought shall deter-
mine upon application that, despite the adjudication of liability but in view of all the
circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity for
such expenses which the Court of Chancery of such other court shall deem proper.
115. See Heyler, Indemnocati'on of CorporateAgents, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1255, 1257 (1976).
116. See Bishop, supra note 86, at 1083.
117. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (1974) provides:
The indemnification provided by this section shall not be deemed exclusive of any
[Vol. 1979:523
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Section 145(g)" s poses an even greater threat to corporate responsi-
bility. I t To assuage the fear of would-be directors over personal liabil-
ity for corporate acts and to attract better corporate leadership,
Delaware in 1967 became the first state to permit a corporation to
purchase liability insurance on behalf of its directors and officers.' 20
Under this subsection a corporation may purchase indemnity insurance
for any officer or director even if it would not have the power to indem-
nify the official against liability under the other provisions of the sec-
tion. Thus, this provision allows a corporate official to escape financial
penalty for his acts regardless of whether he "acted in good faith or in a
manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best in-
terests of the corporation."' 2' Without limitations on the availability of
insurance, section 145(g) effectively removes whatever deterrent effect
the imposition of liability on a corporate official may have on corporate
misbehavior and abuse of power.' 22  Furthermore, directors and of-
other rights to which those seeking indemnification may be entitled under any bylaw,
agreement, vote of stockholders or disinterested directors or otherwise, both as to action
in his official capacity and as to action in another capacity while holding such office, and
shall continue as to a person who has ceased to be a director, officer, employee or agent
and shall inure to the benefit of the heirs, executors and administrators of such a person.
The nature and scope of this subsection is not altogether clear. A drafter's comment indicates that
courts should limit the provision where public policy requires. See Bishop, supra note 86, at 1085.
Critics nonetheless argue that the legislature should specifically define the scope of indemnifica-
tion under § 145 and make it exclusive. See Cary, supra note 6, at 702. One critic, however, has
remarked that "[slubsection (f) may be a manifestation of reluctance to meddle with the incom-
prehensible rather than a deliberate effort to geld the statute." Bishop, supra note 86, at 1086.
118. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1974) provides:
A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any
person who is or was a director, officer, employee or agent of the corporation, or is or
was serving at the request of the corporation as a director, officer, employee or agent of
another corporation, partnership, joint venture, trust or other enterprise against any lia-
bility asserted against him and incurred by him in any such capacity, or arising out of his
status as such, whether or not the corporation would have the power to indemnify him
against such liability under the provisions of this section.
119. See Bishop, supra note 86, at 1086; Comment, supra note 85, at 885.
120. Note, supra note 76, at 1121-27.
121. Bishop, supra note 86, at 1086. Taken literally, the subsection seems to mean that, as far
as Delaware law is concerned, a corporation may insure its management against any obligation to
account to the corporation for profits from any of the numerous varieties of self-dealing, from
usurping the corporation's business opportunities through paying its directors excessive compen-
sation to plain embezzlement, each of which stockholders typically allege in derivative suits.
Id at 1086-87.
122. Bishop, supra note 86, at 1086; Comment, supra note 85, at 885. Although most insur-
,ance companies impose limitations and conditions on their coverage, see Bishop, supra note 86, at
1088-89 (sample insurance policy exclusions), these restrictions do not appease all critics. See
Note, supra note 76, at 1131. Critics also question the effectiveness of insurance exclusions, such
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ficers should not be permitted to avoid the legally imposed duties of
good faith and due care through the purchase of liability insurance.
1 23
Despite these criticisms, some commentators favor indemnity insur-
ance over indemnification payments to corporate officials for its less
severe burden on the corporation and its stockholders. 24 The costs of
direct indemnification flow immediately from the corporate treasury to
the corporation and its shareholders in the form of reduced assets for
corporate operations and shareholder dividends. Insurance premiums,
on the other hand, impose a less severe and more predictable expense
on the corporation than do massive damage awards.
California recently enacted an indemnification statute 25 that pro-
vides a preferable model for a federal chartering or minimum stan-
dards act. Like the Delaware version, the California provisions
distinguish between third-party suits brought against directors by out-
siders 26 and derivative suits filed by shareholders in the name of the
corporation.127 The California provisions, however, strike a more equi-
as for intentional or reckless conduct, as a means to deter corporate misbehavior or unlawful
conduct. See id; Corporate Executives, supra note 93, at 655.
123. See Bishop, supra note 86, at 1091.
124. See Note, supra note 76, at 1145.
125. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317 (Deering Supp. 1979). See generally 16 MARSH'S CALIFORNIA
PRACTICE §§ 9.35-.46 (1977).
The indemnification provisions of the California statute are discussed in Heyler, Indemnocatlon
of Corporate,4gents, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1255 (1976); Note, Californias New General Corporation
Law: Director's Liability to Corporations, 7 PAc. LREv. 613, 639 (1976).
126. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(b) (Deering Supp. 1979) provides:
A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was or is a party or is
threatened to be made a party to any proceeding (other than an action by or in the right
of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor) by reason of the fact that such
person is or was an agent of the corporation, against expenses, judgments, fines, settle-
ments and other amounts actually and reasonably incurred in connection with such pro-
ceeding if such person acted in good faith and in a manner such person reasonably
believed to be in the best interests of the corporation and, in the case of a criminal
proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe the conduct of such person was unlawful.
The termination of any proceeding by judgment, order, settlement, conviction or upon a
plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent shall not, of itself, create a presumption that the
person did not act in good faith and in a manner which the person reasonably believed
to be in the best interests of the corporation or that the person had reasonable cause to
believe that the person's conduct was unlawful.
See also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 723(a) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
127. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(c) (Deering Supp. 1979) provides:
A corporation shall have the power to indemnify any person who was or is a party or
is threatened to be made a party to any threatened, pending or completed action by or in
the right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor by reason of the fact that
such person is or was an agent of the corporation, against expenses actually and reason-
ably incurred by such person in connection with the defense or settlement of such action
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/9
INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS
table balance between the competing policy considerations surrounding
the indemnification debate.
For third-party actions, Delaware authorizes indemnification when
the director has "acted in good faith and in a manner he reasonably
believed to be or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation."128
Section 317(b) of the California standard, however, does not contain
the "or not opposed to" language;' 29 thus, it more properly restricts the
availability of indemnification to cases of good faith and reasonable
mistakes by directors. 30 Similarly, the California standard more satis-
factorily addresses director indemnification in derivative actions. To
be eligible for reimbursement under section 317(c), the director must
have acted not only in a good faith and reasonable manner, as required
under the Delaware law, but also "with such care, including reasonable
inquiry, as an ordinary prudent person in a like position would use
under similar circumstances."'' Under the California version, there-
fore, the director's actions must be objectively as well as subjectively
reasonable.
Like the Delaware statute, California's indemnification statute pro-
hibits indemnification without prior court approval for judgments ren-
dered against the director in,' 32 or expenses incurred in settlement
of,' 33 derivative actions. The California version goes one step further,
if such person acted in good faith, in a manner such person believed to be in the best
interests of the corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordi-
narily prudent person in a like position would use under similar circumstances. No in-
demnification shall be made under this subdivision (c):
(1) In respect of any claim, issue or matter as to which such person shall have been
adjudged to be liable to the corporation in the performance of such person's duty to the
corporation, unless and only to the extent that the court in which such proceeding is or
was pending shall determine upon application that, in view of all the circumstances of
the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity for the expenses
which such court shall determine;
(2) Of amounts paid in settling or otherwise disposing of a threatened or pending ac-
tion, with or without court approval; or
(3) Of expenses incurred in defending a threatened or pending action which is settled
or otherwise disposed of without court approval.
128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (1974) (emphasis added).
129. See note 114 supra.
130. See Heyler, supra note 115, at 1258.
131. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(c) (Deering Supp. 1979). This language is similar to the New
York standard that requires "good faith and with that degree of care which an ordinarily prudent
person in a like position would use under similar circumstances." N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 717,
722(a) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
132. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(c)(1) (Deering Supp. 1979).
133. CAL CORP. CODE § 317(c)(3) (Deering Supp. 1979). Accord, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 722(b)(2) (McKinney 1963). In contrast, Delaware allows indemnification for expenses incurred
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however, to forbid indemnification for judgments or amounts paid in
settlement of derivative actions with or without court approval. 34 The
reason for this prohibition is obvious: To permit a corporation to reim-
burse a director for the same sum that the director is liable to the cor-
poration would be circular without any determination on the merits of
the director's conduct. 135 A federal act clearly should adopt the Cali-
fornia approach.
Another praiseworthy section of the California indemnifcation stat-
ute is section 317(e), which authorizes indemnity by majority vote of a
quorum of directors not parties to the proceeding, or by majority vote
of the disinterested shareholders. 136 These alternatives to judicial ap-
proval of indemnification provide greater flexibility for determining
whether indemnification is appropriate in a particular case. Moreover,
those persons with the greatest knowledge of an interest in the standard
of care expected of directors have a role in the indemnification deci-
sion. Costly court determinations of whether the requisite standard of
care has been met also may be avoided or relied upon solely as a last
resort. 1
37
as a result of "any threatened, pending or completed action or suit." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 145(b) (1974).
134. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(c)(2) (Deering Supp. 1979). Accord, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 722(b)(1) (McKinney 1963).
135. See Heyler, supra note 115, at 1261.
136. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(e)(1)-(2) (Deering Supp. 1979) provides:
(e) Except as provided in subdivision (d), any indemnification under this section shall
be made by the corporation only if authorized in the specific case, upon a determination
that indenmification of the agent is proper in the circumstances because the agent has
met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in subdivision (b) or (c), by:
(1) A majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who are not parties to such
proceeding;
(2) Approval of the shareholders (Section 153), with the shares owned by the person to
be indemnified not being entitled to vote thereon.
Both the Delaware and New York statutes provide for authorization of indemnification by in-
dependent legal counsel if a quorum of directors, not parties to the action, is unobtainable. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(d) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724(b)(2)(A) (McKinney 1963).
137. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(e)(3) (Deering Supp. 1979) provides:
(e) Except as provided in subdivision (d), any indemnification under this section shall
be made by the corporation only if authorized in the specific case, upon a determination
that indemnification of the agent is proper in the circumstances because the agent has
met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in subdivision (b) or (c), by:
(3) The court in which such proceeding is or was pending upon application made by
the corporation or the agent or the attorney or other person rendering services in connec-
tion with the defense, whether or not such application by the agent, attorney or other
person is opposed by the corporation.
New York also provides for this alternative. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 725 (McKinney 1963).
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Section 317(d) provides for mandatory indemnification of directors
in either third-party or derivative suits when the director prevails on
the merits of the action.' 38 This provision grants the director an en-
forceable right to indemnification, which is essential in cases in which
the director is denied reimbursement by an antagonistic board. 39 Sec-
tion 317(f) further provides that a corporation, upon approval of its
board of directors, may make advance payments to a director for ex-
penses incurred in defense of any proceeding. 140 These guarantees of
financial assistance are of major significance to a federal chartering act
because they advance the objective of attracting competent persons to
serve as directors without fear of oppressive risks of personal liability.
The California statute further improves upon the Delaware version
through its restriction on the availability of indemnification to the
terms and conditions prescribed in the statute.' 4' The Delaware stat-
ute, as previously criticized, expressly provides that indemnification
under the statute does not preclude an indemnified party from asserting
138. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(d) (Deering Supp. 1979) provides:
To the extent that an agent of a corporation has been successful on the merits in defense
of any proceeding referred to in subdivision (b) or (c) or in defense of any claim, issue or
matter therein, the agent shall be indemnified against expenses actually and reasonably
incurred by the agent in connection therewith.
See also DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 724(a) (McKinney 1963).
139. See Heyler, supra note 115, at 1261.
140. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317() (Deering Supp. 1979) provides:
Expenses incurred in defending any proceeding may be advanced by the corporation
prior to the final disposition of such proceeding upon receipt of an undertaking by or on
behalf of the agent to repay such amount unless it shall be determined ultimately that the
agent is entitled to be indemnified as authorized in this section.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(h) (Deering Supp. 1979), however, limits the scope of § 317(0:
No indemnification or advance shall be made under this section, except as provided in
subdivision (d) or paragraph (3) of subdivision (e), in any circumstance where it appears:
(1) That it would be inconsistent with a provision of the articles, bylaws, a resolution of
the shareholders or an agreement in effect at the time of the holders or an agreement in
effect at the time of the accrual of the alleged cause of action asserted in the proceeding
in which the expenses were incurred or other amounts were paid, which prohibits or
otherwise limits indemnification; or
(2) That it would be inconsistent with any condition expressly imposed by a court in
approving a settlement.
See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(e) (1974); N.Y. Bus. CoP,. LAW § 724(c) (McKinney 1963).
141. CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(g) (Deering Supp. 1979) provides:
No provision made by a corporation to indemnify its or its subsidiary's directors or of-
ficers for the defense of any proceeding, whether contained in the articles, bylaws, a
resolution of shareholders or directors, an agreement or otherwise, shall be valid unless
consistent with this section. Nothing contained in this section shall affect any right to
indemnification to which persons other than such directors and officers may be entitled
by contract or otherwise.
The New York provision is similar. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 721 (McKinney 1963).
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any other rights to indemnification to which he may be entitled under
any bylaw, agreement, or vote of the stockholders or disinterested di-
rectors. 42 The Delaware statute implies that any form of indemnifica-
tion is permissible regardless of its scope. In enacting a model statute
for a federal system, California's exclusivity provision should be
adopted for its advantages of uniformity and predictability and its su-
perior ability to effectuate public policy objectives. 143
A final consideration in the development of a federal indemnification
model concerns whether a corporation should be permitted to purchase
liability insurance on behalf of its directors. Following the lead of Del-
aware,'" California grants the corporation the power "to purchase and
maintain insurance on behalf of any agent of the corporation against
any liability. . . whether or not the corporation would have the power
to indemnify" under California law.' 45 Commentators continue to de-
bate whether this provision authorizes all-embracing liability coverage
for directors in contravention of public policy considerations. 46 For
142. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(f) (1974). See note 119 supra.
143. In addition to providing greater certainty as to the limits of permissible indemnifica-
tion, the exclusive approach has several other significant advantages. First, it provides a
certain amount of uniformity and predictability in the indemnification rights of corpo-
rate personnel. Any area so closely tied with public policy that courts are willing to
override clear legislative intent should seek uniform application of the law. Surely a
non-exclusive clause can never achieve that aim, as it encourages a diverse "bylaw by
bylaw" application since each corporation is free to place in its bylaws any provision it
wishes.
Second, the exclusive language is a more effective means to implement public policy.
The non-exclusive language lends itself to indemnification under bylaws which grossly
violate the bounds of public policy but which may never be challenged due to stock-
holder apathy or lack of notice. On the other hand, the exclusive statute defines the
limits of public policy in the statute itself and prohibits any indemnity inconsistent with
those limits.
Third, the exclusive statute need not abrogate the corporate freedom which defenders
of the non-exclusive statute say can exist only if the corporation can indemnify outside
the provisions of the statute. If the exclusive statute has been broadly drafted, then any
provision outside its limits would be prohibited by public policy. Additionally, the cor-
poration should still have the freedom to choose, since the statute should merely grant
the power to indemnify within its limits and should not be mandatory as a whole.
Cheek, s.upra note 85, at 277 (citations omitted).
144. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (1974).
145. CAL. COP. CODE § 317(i) (Deering Supp. 1979) provides:
A corporation shall have power to purchase and maintain insurance on behalf of any
agent of the corporation against any liability asserted against or incurred by the agent in
such capacity or arising out of the agent's status as such whether or not the corporation
would have the power to indemnify the agent against such liability under the provisions
of this section.
146. See notes 123-25 supra and accompanying text. Other commentators, such as Samuel
Arsht, argue that a literal reading is unwarranted and that these provisions do not authorize or
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss2/9
Number 2] INDEMNIFICATION OF DIRECTORS
this reason, the ambiguity of Delaware and California statutory lan-
guage should be abandoned for the clarity of the New York statute.
The New York statute specifies the situations in which the corporation
may purchase liability insurance and resolves the dispute over the
scope of the purchased coverage.' 47 The statute clearly restricts cover-
age to the cost of defense "if a judgment or final adjudication adverse
empower an insurance company to issue a policy insuring against a risk that it either could not or
would not assume in the absence of such provisions.
I submit, however, that those who have criticized Section 145(g) have read more into
that provision than is fairly warranted by its language and that for this reason, as well as
others, the parade of horrors which has been envisioned will never come to pass ...
Initially, let me say that Subsection (g) does nothing more than it purports to do. It
authorizes a Delaware corporation to pay the premium for directors' and officers' liabil-
ity insurance. Such insurance has typically consisted of two separate policies. . . .The
coverage provided under one policy reimburses the corporation for sums properly paid
to the director or officer as indemnification, while the coverage under the other policy
directly indemnifies the directors or officers against liability and expenses not properly
indemnifiable by the corporation. These two policies are sold as a package to the corpo-
ration, and the insurance companies have traditionally refused to sell the latter policy to
corporate executives individually.
As a consequence of this practice, prior to 1967, when the Delaware statute was en-
acted, the corporation desiring to insure itself for its obligation to indemnify its directors
and officers was placed in the position of being able to obtain such insurance for itself
only in conjunction with insurance for its directors and officers insuring the latter for
their non-indemnifiable outlays, and then of having to apportion the premium for such
dual insurance coverage between itself and its executives. These premiums were usually
apportioned on a ninety-ten basis with the corporation paying the larger portion since it
was felt-and properly, I think-that insuring the corporation for payments properly
made by the corporation as indemnification presented a much larger risk than insuring
the executives directly for their covered risks.
Nevertheless, the corporation, or, rather, its directors were faced with the possibility
that a challenge to the method of apportionment could result in a finding that they were
achieving indirectly what they could not achieve directly, that is, impermissible indemni-
fication. Subsection (g) was intended to lay such fears to rest by expressly authorizing
payment by the corporation of the entire insurance premium. The "whether-or-not"
clause in Subsection (g) was merely intended to encompass both coverages provided in a
typical D & 0 policy.
Professor Bishop suggests that a literal reading of Subsection (g) leads to the conclu-
sion that it authorizes all-embracing liability insurance for directors and officers. Not so.
Subsection (g) is a corporation law, not an insurance law. It does no more than authorize
the corporation to pay the premiums for such insurance as it or its directors are able to
obtain. It does not authorize or empower an insurance company to issue a policy insur-
ing against a risk which it either could not or would not issue in the absence of Subsec-
tion (g). If a risk were not insurable before Subsection (g), the subsection's enactment
did not make it so.
Klink, Chalif, Bishop & Arsht, Liabilities Which Can Be Covered Under State Statutes and Corpo-
rate Br-Laws, 27 Bus. LAW. 109, 126-27 (Feb. 1972).
147. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 727 (McKinney Supp. 1978) provides:
(a) Subject to paragraph (b), a corporation shall have power to purchase and main-
tain insurance:
(1) To indemnify the corporation for any obligation which it incurs as a result of the
indemnification of directors and officers under the provisions of this article, and
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to the insured director or officer establishes that his acts of active and
deliberate dishonesty were material to the cause of action adjudicated,
or that he personally gained in fact a financial profit or other advantage
to which he was not legally entitled."' 4 This restriction will satisfy the
advocates of federal chartering who realize the need for insurance in
the corporate setting, but demand that indemnification and insurance
be strictly prescribed to encourage high standards of corporate respon-
sibility.
IV. CONCLUSION
The need to attract competent persons to corporate directorships pro-
vides a compelling justification for a system of director indemnifica-
tion. The present-day director faces a significantly greater risk of
liability for his actions, which may cause those most qualified to serve
as directors to be reluctant to participate on corporate boards or to de-
cline service altogether. At the same time, a real concern exists that
indemnification will lower the standard of care required of directors or
allow directors to escape liability for intentional misconduct.
A balance between attracting competent directors and deterring mis-
conduct may be achieved if reasonable indemnification standards are
(2) To indemnify directors and officers in instances in which they may be indemni-
fied by the corporation under the provisions of this article, and
(3) To indemnify directors and officers in instances in which they may not otherwise
be indemnified by the corporation under the provisions of this article provided the con-
tract of insurance covering such directors and officers provides, in a manner acceptable
to the superintendent of insurance, for a retention amount and for co-insurance.
(b) No insurance under paragraph (a) may provide for any payment, other than cost
of defense, to or on behalf of any director or officer.
(I) if ajudgment or other final adjudication adverse to the insured director or officer
establishes that his acts of active and deliberate dishonesty were material to the cause of
action so adjudicated, or that he personally gained in fact a financial profit or other
advantage to which he was not legally entitled, or
(2) in relation to any risk the insurance of which is prohibited under the insurance
law of this state.
(c) Insurance under any or all subparagraphs of paragraph (a) may be included in a
single contract or supplement thereto. Retrospective rated contracts are prohibited.
(d) The corporation shall, within the time and to the persons provided in paragraph
(c) of section 726 (Other provisions affecting indemnification of directors or officers),
mail a statement in respect of any insurance it has purchased or renewed under this
section, specifying the insurance carrier, date of the contract, cost of the insurance, cor-
porate positions insured, and a statement explaining all sums, not previously reported in
a statement to shareholders, paid under any indemnification insurance contract.
(e) This section is the public policy of this state to spread the risk of corporate man-
agement, notwithstanding any other general or special law of this state or of any other
jurisdiction including the federal government.
148. N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 727(b)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
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established. Left to their own initiative, the individual states seem un-
likely to strike an appropriate balance. The states remain willing to
grant corporations special treatment to retain their presence within the
state or to entice foreign corporations into the state. At best, state ef-
forts to regulate director indemnification will lack the uniformity a fed-
eral system could provide. From the Constitutional Convention of
1786 to the congressional debates of today, calls for a federal chartering
system continue to be voiced. The indemnification of corporate direc-
tors for corporate misconduct is a controversy well-suited to a federal
alternative.
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